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Abstract
Globally and locally, government support policies for green goods (like renewable
energy) are much more popular internationally than raising the cost of bads (as through carbon
taxes). These support policies may encourage downstream consumption (renewable energy
deployment) or upstream development and manufacturing of those technologies. The use of
subsidies—particularly upstream ones—is disciplined by World Trade Organization agreements,
and its subsidies code lacks exceptions for transboundary externalities like human health or
resource conservation, including those related to combating global climate change. The strategic
trade literature has devoted little attention to the range of market failures related to green goods.
This paper considers the market for a new environmental good that when consumed downstream
may provide external benefits like reduced emissions. The technology is traded internationally
but provided by a limited set of upstream suppliers that may operate in imperfect markets, such
as with market power or external scale economies. We examine the national incentives and
global rationales for offering production and consumption subsidies in producer countries,
allowing that some of the downstream market may lie in nonregulating third-party countries.
Although technology producer countries can benefit from restraints on upstream subsidies,
global welfare is higher without them, and market failures imply that optimal subsidies are even
higher. We supplement the analysis with numerical simulations of the case of renewable energy,
exploring optimal subsidies for the major renewable energy producing and consuming regions
and the cost of restrictions on upstream subsidies.
Keywords: international trade, subsidies, imperfect competition, externalities, emissions leakage
JEL numbers: F13, F18, H21, Q5
One sentence: Trade-distorting subsidies may be under- (not over-) provided by strategic
countries when market failures are present.
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Introduction
World Trade Organization (WTO) rules create restrictions on industrial policies that
distort trade, particularly subsidies. In contrast to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the subsidies code) lacks exceptions
for transboundary externalities like human health or resource conservation, including those
related to combating global climate change. Yet policies that support green goods (like
renewable energy) are much more popular internationally than policies that impose a cost on
bads (like carbon taxes). As the global community moves toward addressing important crossborder environmental and health challenges, does the multilateral trade regime need to
reconsider its approach to subsidies for green goods?
Climate policies offer a striking example of these tensions over subsidies. Economists
have reached a consensus that the best way to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is to put
a global price on those emissions (much as scientists have reached a broad consensus over the
existence and potential perils of global climate change). However, whereas only about 40
countries and 20 subnational jurisdictions are using or planning to implement carbon pricing
(World Bank 2014), nearly 100 countries and countless subnational jurisdictions offer financial
incentives for renewable energy (IEA/IRENA 2015). Indeed, all the jurisdictions with carbon
pricing also rely on renewable energy support. The measures range from downstream measures
that support deployment to upstream incentives for R&D and manufacturing. In 2012, the value
of European Union (EU) interventions for renewable energy exceeded the value of all the
emissions trading allowances allocated for the year.3
In some cases, the subsidies are becoming substantial and distorting enough to raise trade
concerns. When Ontario instituted a feed-in-tariff with domestic content requirements (in
essence, leveraging the downstream deployment subsidy to support upstream local
manufacturing), the European Union, Japan, and others complained, and the WTO panel and
3

Alberici et al. (2014) find that “in 2012, the total value of public interventions in energy (excluding transport) in
the EU-28 is €2012 122 billion,” with €2012 41 billion for renewable energy (p. i-ii). Meanwhile, in 2012, the
annual allocation of allowances was 2170 million; at an average annual price of roughly €7, the value of the annual
cap was just over €2012 15 billion. Sources: http://www.eex.com/en/market-data/emission-allowances/auctionmarket/european-emission-allowances-auction/european-emission-allowances-auction-download and
http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/data-viewers/emissions-trading-viewer.

appellate body struck down the policy (Charnovitz and Fischer 2014). In another set of cases, the
European Union and United States have brought antidumping and antisubsidy complaints against
China, charging that large Chinese subsidies in the form of cheap loans, land, and capital to
photovoltaic producers constitute illegal aid. WTO (2011) has stated that its rules do not hinder
supporting the deployment and diffusion of green technologies. Downstream subsidies can
indeed be designed in a nondiscriminatory fashion, but upstream policies almost necessarily
offer preferential treatment to domestic producers. Thus, it is important to understand whether an
economic rationale exists to carve out exceptions in the WTO subsidies code to make room for
certain kinds of green industrial policy (Rubini 2012).
Export and production subsidies have been studied in the strategic trade literature. An
influential early example was the pair of studies by Spencer and Brander (1983) and Brander and
Spencer (1985), who study a Cournot duopoly of producer countries exporting to a third market.
Dixit (1984) extends their analysis to multiple firms, Krugman (1984) to the case of increasing
returns to scale, and Leahy and Neary (1999) to R&D spillovers. Eaton and Grossman (1986)
compare Cournot with Bertrand competition. These studies tend to focus on the strategic interest
of the producer countries, typically exporting to third countries, and whether their joint interests
are better served by restricting trade interventions. However, questions of global welfare or
correcting market failures—important aspects of international environmental policy—are
deemphasized or ignored. Indeed, we will show that changing this emphasis can change the
policy implications for subsidies.
Market failures have been an important focus of studies of overlapping climate policies,
their interactions, and costs (see, e.g., Fischer and Preonas 2010, Fischer et al. 2013, and Fischer
and Newell 2008 for the electricity sector; and De Gorter and Just 2010 and Anderson et al. 2016
for biofuels; and a broad review in OECD 2011). Indeed, in the absence of other market failures,
renewable energy subsidies increase the costs of meeting an emissions target (Böhringer and
Rosendahl 2010). Fischer et al. (2013) explore the extent to which knowledge market failures or
spillovers justify subsidies to correct the underprovision of R&D and learning by doing by
private markets. In an application to the US electricity sector, they find optimal learning (i.e.,
deployment) subsidies are plausibly in the range of 1 cent/kWh or less for conventional
renewable energy technologies like wind, and a higher but still modest range of 4–6 cents/kWh
for solar. Hübler et al. (2015) look at second-best renewable energy policies for Europe and find

that policy constraints can justify additional deployment support, but the optimal levels are again
quite modest, since learning in renewables is still less cost-effective than other mitigation options
in the electricity sector. Importantly, all of these studies focus on a single region and ignore the
possibility of international linkages through trade in renewable energy technologies.
Carbon leakage—when reduction efforts taken in one region may, through global trade,
be undone to some extent by changes in emissions abroad—may be another reason why national
policymakers like to supplement or even substitute carbon pricing with low-carbon technology
policies. Keeping carbon prices low for industry can avoid damaging the competitiveness of
energy-intensive, trade-exposed sectors. Furthermore, spillovers from the development of green
technologies can lower mitigation costs for other countries (Gerlagh and Kuik 2014; Barker et al.
2007; Golombek and Hoel 2004), though there can be strategic reasons to avoid transferring
clean technologies, even if it would reduce global emissions, when the polluting goods are traded
(Glachant et al. 2016).
The characteristics of upstream markets for the provision of clean technologies may offer
additional rationales for support. Low-carbon energy technologies are newer, the number of
suppliers is relatively small, and patent restrictions still play an important role, as do the
emergence of scale economies. As such, the typical upstream market can hardly be considered
perfectly competitive (Requate 2005), and interventions may be justified to address market
failures in the provision of renewable energy technologies.
Few papers in the environmental economics literature have distinguished between
upstream technology suppliers and downstream adopters in a model of international trade. This
distinction is important, since upstream interventions that lower supplier costs then lower the
global price of a green good, increasing consumption abroad, whereas downstream subsidies
drive up global prices, reducing foreign consumption. Thus, when consumption of the green
good is associated with avoided emissions, the two policies have different implications for
foreign emissions. Greaker and Rosendahl (2008) consider strategic emissions regulation when
upstream markets are imperfect, finding that an individual country may want to impose an
excessively stringent environmental policy in order to reduce the markup of technology
suppliers, and hence increase the diffusion of these technologies. Fischer et al. (2014) consider
subsidies for end-of-pipe abatement technology in a two-country model with Cournot

competitors upstream and competitive trade-exposed industries downstream, identifying a global
and strategic advantage to upstream subsidies.4
This paper generalizes the problem of upstream and downstream market failures and
trade. It takes a far more comprehensive approach than previous theoretical studies in the
environmental or trade literatures, allowing for multiple regions and firms, multiple upstream
market failures (imperfect competition and scale effects with spillovers), and different
downstream externalities. Using linear forms for supply and demand curves, closed-form unique
solutions for optimal and strategic Nash subsidies are derived as a function of the market failures
and parameters of interest. A calibrated numerical exercise then estimates the levels and welfare
effects of optimal and strategic equilibrium subsidies for the case of renewable energy and
explores their sensitivity to different market failure assumptions.
Renewable energy is an interesting application because the technologies are traded
internationally and arguably are characterized by multiple market failures. For example, the top
four producers of wind turbines (firms located in the United States and Europe) supply roughly
half the global market; 70% of global production occurs in the United States, Europe, and China.
Production of solar modules distributed across more manufacturers, but more than 30% occurs in
China; scale economies and learning are important factors in that sector (Nemet 2006, 2009;
Swanson 2006; Schaeffer 2004; Bruton 2002). The external benefits of renewable energy
deployment are also highly sensitive to where and how they are applied. The extent to which
they reduce emissions depends both on a country’s supply mix of polluting energy sources and
on the downstream policy environment: whether the country values the social costs of carbon
and to what extent it prices its emissions.
We find several potential rationales for subsidies, particularly for upstream production,
not only for individual countries but also from a global perspective. In particular, we find that
strategically determined subsidies may actually undercorrect market failures, rather than be
overly generous to domestic producers.
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Also for the duopoly case, Fischer et al. (2016) note the importance of the regulatory setting downstream. They
consider the setting of renewable energy technology when downstream markets are regulated with renewable
portfolio standards (market share mandates). In this case, the global emissions effects are opposite: a decrease in the
global price allows dirty generation to expand when the portfolio standard becomes less binding.

In the next section we describe our general model framework. Next we derive results
isolating the different market failures. Then we use a numerical model to explore optimal
subsidies for renewable energy technologies used in the electricity sector. The final section
concludes.

Model framework
We present a partial equilibrium model of a single sector in which production and
consumption of an identical environmental good (e.g., a wind turbine or solar panel) occurs
across multiple countries with trade. Because we have in mind a relatively small sector in the
economy, we forego modeling general equilibrium effects, noting that under standard
assumptions the results carry through in a general equilibrium model with terms of trade.5
Consider a world divided into three regions: a domestic producing and consuming region
(1), a foreign producing and consuming region (2), and a third-party consuming region (3).
Markets are decentralized, and the products are assumed to be identical; this assumption allows
for consistency of representation across the different market failures, as well as for the
parameterization of downstream demand for renewable energy technology in our numerical
application.
Each producing region i  {1, 2} may offer to subsidize downstream deployment by i
and/or to lower the unit delivery costs of the upstream technology firms by  i . We assume the
third country has no subsidy policies (e.g., a developing country without climate policy
obligations); thus, 3  0 .
Although certain results could be derived with general functional forms, we choose to use
common functional forms to derive closed-form solutions for all our equilibria of interest.6 These
simplifications allow us to evaluate equilibria with multiple policies and to compare optimal and
constrained strategies across heterogeneous regions and with a social planner. We subsequently
use the same forms in a parameterized numerical model.
5

Brander and Spencer (1985) show this with an additive utility function including a perfectly competitive numeraire
good.
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Linear demand and constant marginal costs are explored in Dixit (1984), and Spencer and Brander(1983); Eaton
and Grossman (1986), while using general functional forms, note that linear demand implies “normal” slopes of the
reaction curves, which ensures existence, uniqueness, and stability of equilibria.

Let us assume the following linear demand functions for the technology in each country,
where mi is a measure of downstream market share of region i (and

m
i
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Total demand is X  x1  x2  x3 . This gives us an inverse demand function facing the
upstream producers of P  A  BX , where the slope equals the identical individual slopes B  b ,
and the intercept equals the weighted average intercept A  a   , where   i mii .
Consumer surplus is the area under each linear demand curve above the consumer price:
CSi 

mi  a  ( P  i ) 

2

2b

Governments place a value on domestic profits,  i , domestic consumer surplus, CSi , net
revenues TRi , and global downstream externalities, EG . They ignore effects on foreign producer
profits and consumer welfare, and possibly undervalue external benefits (vi  vG ) . (Since the
environmental spillover case is the most interesting, let us assume that the external benefits are
reductions in a global pollutant like greenhouse gases, as opposed to a local pollutant).8
Welfare for each of the three regions is

W1  1  CS1  TR1  v1 EG
W2   2  CS2  TR2  v2 EG
W3  CS3  v3 EG
WG  W1  W2  W3  (vG  v1  v2  v3 ) EG
Total revenues are the cost of the upstream and downstream subsidy payments for a
producer country: TRi   iYi i xi . The external benefits are proportional to consumption of the
product, and we allow different countries to have different global benefits from the
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One could vary other demand parameters by country, as we do in the numerical simulations, but the strategic issues
related to heterogeneous downstream demand are captured sufficiently by the parameter m.
8

For example, EPA calculates that the marginal benefits of emissions reductions in the United States domestically
are between $1 and $4, but global marginal benefits are in the range of $40 per ton CO2 (Metcalf and Stock 2015).
EPA guidelines are to use the global social cost of carbon.

environmental good: EG  1 x1  2 x2  3 x3 . For example, renewable energy use can displace
emissions from fossil energy by factor i in country i.
The strategic subsidy choice can be modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage of the
game, a region chooses whether and how much to subsidize downstream and upstream. We may
think of this cost subsidy as the net effect of a range of policies, including direct subsidies, R&D
support etc.9 In the second stage of the game, downstream demand is met, and the technology
firms compete to supply renewable energy technology equipment to the downstream consumers
in all regions.
We first solve for the optimal subsidy strategy from the point of view of a global planner.
We then consider a Nash equilibrium, in which each region chooses optimal subsidies, given the
choices of the others. We may also consider unilateral policies, assuming no subsidies in the
other regions, or second-best subsidies, when trade rules, say, prohibit the use of either upstream
or downstream subsidies.
We begin with the simplifying assumption that our two producing regions are symmetric.
We will later relax this assumption to explore asymmetry numerically. All the solutions can be
derived algebraically, and for convenience we do this in Mathematica and report only the results;
more details are given in the Appendix, and files are available upon request. Knowing the market
equilibrium response to subsidies, each actor maximizes welfare with respect to the policy levers
it controls, upstream and/or downstream subsidies in the producing states, taking as given the
policy choices in the other region.
Specifically, the global planner would maximize global welfare with respect to choosing
upstream and downstream subsidies in each producing region. That is,

WG /  1  0, WG / 1  0, WG /  2  0, WG / 2  0. When effects are symmetric, we
restrict the optimal subsidies to be symmetric, to allow better comparison to the noncooperative
equilibrium. We also consider the cases in which either downstream or upstream subsidies are
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The welfare effects of R&D support may be different from the effects of direct
subsidies. This is disregarded in our welfare analysis below as we do not focus on innovation
externalities.

restricted to zero, implying the conditions WG /  1  0,1  0, WG /  2  0,2  1 or

 1  0, WG / 1  0,  2  0, WG / 2  .
In the Nash game, each producing country maximizes its own welfare, taking as given the
subsidy choices of the other actor, and knowing the subsequent effects on the international
market equilibrium. In equilibrium, W1 /  1  0, W1 / 1  0, W2 /  2  0, W2 / 2  0 all
must hold. In the cases where subsidy choice is restricted either upstream or downstream, we
consider W1 /  1  0,1  0, W2 /  2  0,2  0 and

 1  0, W1 / 1  0,  2  0, W2 / 2  0 .
Market failures
We elaborate the three types of market failures: imperfect competition, downstream
externalities, and external scale economies. All of our market failures lead to underprovision of
the good, which can in theory be corrected by either upstream or downstream subsidies. It is
important to make the distinction between these policy levers, since the strategic incentives
differ, as do WTO disciplines. We also emphasize production and consumption subsidies
together. The trade literature has more traditionally evaluated export subsidies, but for the case of
renewable energy, the former are much more important in practice than the latter.
Imperfect competition
We begin with the market failure of imperfect competition in the upstream market. As we
consider identical products, we model the well-known case of Cournot competition. The analysis
is similar to Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986), but we include
consumption as well as production subsidies, allow for multiple firms within each country, and
place a greater emphasis on the global welfare effects of internalizing the upstream market
failure.
The Cournot framework is well suited not only for placing the results in context with the
previous trade literature but also for representing the renewable energy technology industry.
Wind turbine manufacturing is highly concentrated among a few major players, as previously
noted. Pillai and McLaughlin (2013) observe that in the solar industry, although products are

vertically differentiated by module efficiency, firm markups are positively associated with firm
size, as would be implied by a Cournot model.
With Cournot competition, firms essentially compete by choosing production capacity,
and this commitment ensures that any subsequent price competition allows for positive markups.
Assume there are N  n1  n2 firms that are identical, save for the upstream subsidy policies of
their countries.10 Total production is Y  Y1  Y2  n1 y1  n2 y2 , and in the supply and demand
equilibrium P  A  BY . A firm country in i maximizes profits, taking as given the output
quantity choices of the other firms (at home and abroad) and any subsidy  i it is offered:

 i   A  B( yi  Yi   c   i ) yi
The first-order condition has marginal revenue equal to marginal cost:

 i
 A  c   i  B(Y  yi )  P  Byi  c   i  0
yi
Let   (n1 1  n2 2 ) / N . From the first-order conditions and the above demand function,
we have equilibrium output of a firm in each country and overall:

yd 

A  c   d  N ( d   )
N(A  c   )
; YC 
B( N  1)
B( N  1)

And the equilibrium price, which includes a cost markup

PC  c   

Ac 
N 1

At the social optimum, absent any other market failures, we would have P  c in all
C*
jurisdictions and Y  ( A  c) / B. In theory, this result could be achieved with downstream

and/or upstream subsidies; however, if the planner is restricted from setting downstream
subsidies in the third region, then the optimal subsidies would be upstream and satisfy

 *  (a  c ) / N . The more concentrated is the industry (smaller N), the greater the
underprovision and the higher the correcting subsidy. Note that since costs are identical, the
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Firm asymmetry has been explored in de Meza (1986) and Neary (1994). We will allow for country-level
asymmetries. As discussed in Eaton and Grossman (1986), two studies—Horstmann and Markusen (1986) and
Venables (1985)—analyze the effects of trade policy with free entry for the case of Cournot competition.

planner does not care where production (or subsidizing) occurs; for ease of comparison, we will
assume subsidies are applied symmetrically.
To explore the different incentives for individual regions and compare them with those of
the planner, we derive the analytical results for symmetric producer countries (as in Brander and
Spencer 1985, but with multiple firms), and report them in the Appendix. (In subsequent
simulations we will allow for asymmetries across regions.) Solving for the optimal subsidies, we
prove the following results when the upstream market competes in Cournot fashion:
Proposition 1(a): In the Nash equilibrium, strategic countries subsidize both upstream and
downstream, while the social planner subsidizes only upstream.
As discussed above, the market failure of imperfect competition is an upstream one, so
the planner finds upstream subsidies sufficient to internalize it. Strategic countries, however,
recognize that the upstream subsidy depresses the market price for foreign sales, so they use
some downstream subsidies to help support the global price and boost their terms of trade, while
internalizing the market failure for their own consumers.
Proposition 1(b): To the extent that the third country has downstream market share, the sum of
the Nash subsidies are less than the planner’s subsidy.
The larger is the third country share, the more that strategic countries shift their subsidies
downstream and underprovide them overall, since the downstream subsidy is less efficient at
counteracting the upstream market failure. We also show that the more competition there is
upstream (more firms), the smaller the subsidies, and the smaller the share of upstream subsidies
in the Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1(c): In the absence of a third-country market, the Nash equilibrium replicates the
social optimum.
With no third-country market, strategic countries do not subsidize downstream; since the
producers together are no longer net exporters, downstream subsidies do not influence the terms
of trade (or rather they benefit upstream producers equally). Upstream subsidies are used to
internalize the upstream market failure, and in the Nash equilibrium the average of the upstream

subsidies converges to the planner’s upstream subsidy. With asymmetric regions, the net
importer contributes a higher upstream subsidy than the net exporter.
Proposition 1(d): Maximizing the joint welfare of the producer countries requires an upstream
tax and a downstream subsidy.
If the producer regions could collude to maximize their joint welfare, not only would they
want to restrict the use of upstream subsidies, but they would want to tax their production and
subsidize consumption to a greater extent than in the Nash equilibrium, since both activities
improve the terms of trade.

The next propositions consider the results when the parties are restricted (such as by
international trade law) from implementing certain types of subsidies.
Proposition 2(a): If the downstream subsidy is not available, producer countries underprovide
upstream subsidies to a greater extent.
Without the downstream subsidy to prop up the global technology price, strategic
countries use smaller upstream subsidies than in the dual-policy Nash equilibrium. Furthermore,
the subsidies are even lower to the extent that the third country has downstream market share,
since producers want to protect their terms of trade and, unlike the global planner, are not
concerned with the welfare of third-party consumers.
Proposition 2(b): If the upstream subsidy is not available, producer countries underprovide
downstream subsidies to the extent they have downstream market share.
Without the upstream policy tool, the globally optimal downstream subsidies in the
producer countries are positive, but less than the optimal upstream subsidy, given that they are a
second-best instrument for counteracting the upstream market failure. Furthermore, strategic
countries provide even smaller downstream subsidies, since part of the effect is to bid up the
global price for their own consumers. However, if the entire technology market is for export to
the third country, strategic countries provide the globally second-best downstream subsidies.

Thus, if the upstream market is characterized by Cournot competition, there is no clear
need in this partial equilibrium model for restrictions on production subsidies. The emphasis on
global welfare is important. For example, Brander and Spencer (1985) look at the case of
Cournot countries with production subsidies and emphasize that producing countries would be
jointly better off with lower subsidies (similar to our Proposition 1(d)); however, they do not
note that global welfare would be higher with higher subsidies. In essence, based on these kinds
of models, an argument for trade law restrictions on upstream subsidies is facilitating collusion
in the upstream market, not improving global welfare.
Downstream externalities
Let us now focus on the downstream external effects. To do so, we consider optimal
policy responses as the upstream market failure goes to zero.
Strategic subsidies without environmental benefits
As the market becomes perfectly competitive, in the absence of another market failure,
not only do the optimal subsidies go to zero, but so do the strategic subsidies, since there are no
excess profits to capture.
*
Nash
Proposition 3: As N   , without environmental benefits,  i  0 , as do  iNash
,vi  0 and i ,vi  0 .

Strategic subsidies with environmental benefits
Now suppose that the consumption of the product downstream has an external benefit of

vG per unit, as in the case of an environmental good. Again, with this market failure, we have
underprovision in the absence of subsidies. At the social optimum, the price should equal the
marginal social cost in each downstream country: PD,i*  c  vG i . Since the externality is
*
downstream, this would suggest implementing the subsidies downstream (i  i vG , i) .

However, in the presence of a third-party country that does not have these policy levers at its
disposal, the optimum cannot be achieved with downstream subsidies alone. If the marginal
benefits of the good are equal across all countries (i   , i) , then upstream subsidies of

 1*   2*  vG  alone suffice to achieve the optimum. But when marginal benefits differ, a
combination of up- and downstream subsidies is needed to maximize welfare.
Proposition 4: As N   , the globally optimal policy is to subsidize upstream at the rate of the
third-country marginal benefit, and to subsidize consumption in the producer countries
according to the difference in the marginal benefit from that of the third country:



*
1

  2*   *  vG 3 ; i*  vG (i  3 ) , i  {1, 2} .
With an external environmental benefit from downstream consumption, the planner

wants the total subsidy in each country to equal the social marginal benefit; that is,

 *  i*  vG i , i . If subsidies cannot be implemented in the third-party country, the optimal
strategy is to use the uniform upstream subsidy to reflect the third-country’s external benefit,
while downstream subsidies (or taxes) are used in the producer countries to adjust net subsidy.
Proposition 5(a): In the Nash equilibrium, moving toward perfect competition ( N   ),
upstream production subsidies become negligible (  i

Nash

 0, i  {1, 2} ), and downstream

consumption subsidies converge to the marginal benefit as valued by that country:

iNash  vi i , i  {1, 2} .

Proposition 5(b): Without a third country, in a Nash equilibrium, the noncooperative subsidies
replicate the social optimum if each country values environmental changes at the global
marginal benefit.
This follows from Proposition 1(c), which notes that without a third-country market, the
producer countries on average do not want to distort the terms of trade. Thus, if vi  vG , since
well, then both market failures will be internalized. The producers combine upstream and
downstream subsidies in such a way that the total subsidies equal those desired by the planner for
each region, assuming the countries adopt the global valuation of the externality. In this case, the
planner is indifferent as to where to target the subsidies, since only the sum matters.

Proposition 5(c): With a third country, a symmetric Nash equilibrium provides insufficient
upstream subsidies and lower environmental gains to the extent that 3  0 , even if vi  vG .
Although strategic countries may care about leakage, the incentive to maintain higher
export prices remains, resulting in global underprovision of the green good. This underprovision
is further exacerbated to the extent that global gains are undervalued locally.

Thus, downstream external benefits provide another situation in which strategic upstream
subsidies may be too low from a global welfare perspective.
External scale economies
With scale effects—such as through learning-by-doing, supply chain effects, or network
economies—unit costs of production may depend on cumulative industry output. To the extent
that these effects spill over to other firms and the benefits are not fully appropriated by the
individual actors, scale will be underprovided by the market. To explore the role of spillovers
from scale effects, we assume that marginal costs are influenced by own and foreign scale of
production. Although some of these processes may be dynamic, let us represent them in
condensed form by shifting marginal production costs according to cumulative market scale in
our static model.
Let marginal production costs be a decreasing function of total industry (domestic and
foreign) scale: that is, c0  gY . 11 Thus, a domestic producer’s profits are

 id   A  B( yid  Ydi  Yf )   d  c0  g ( yid  Ydi  Yf )  yd
j
In the competitive equilibrium we have n j yi  Y j for each region j. The first-order

condition for the individual domestic producer is

 d
 A  c0   d  ( B  g )( yd (nd  1)  n f y f )
yd
 P  c0  gY   d  ( B  g ) yd
11

Assuming full spillovers maintains the assumption of identical costs across firms and leads to a symmetric optimal
policy. Incomplete international spillovers results in asymmetric cost effects and an optimal strategy that could
target one region or another for upstream support and increase the market share of the lower-cost provider.

Adding the first-order conditions for all producers in both regions and solving for Y gives

Y

N ( A  c0   )
.
( N  1)( B  g )

To better compare the case of scale economies with that of imperfect competition alone,
we want to consider cost parameters such that the baseline no-policy supply is the same as that
without the assumption of scale effects. That is, for Y NP 

N (a  c0 )
N (a  c)
, we need

( N  1)( B  g ) ( N  1) B

c0  c  (a  c) g / B .

Furthermore, we restrict ourselves to the case of normally behaved supply responses and
positive optimal subsidies, implying that the scale economies do not exceed half the slope of
demand  B  2 g  .12
To focus on the effects of scale economies, let us assume there is no downstream
environmental externality. Now we can compare the effect of scale economies on optimal
subsidies. (All proofs appear in the Appendix).
Proposition 6: With external scale effects, the globally optimal policy is to offer upstream
subsidies that are higher than with imperfect competition alone and to offer no downstream
subsidies.
Upstream subsidies are best suited to internalize the twin upstream market failures:
spillover effects from the scale economies and underprovision by Cournot competitors. Because
spillovers represent an additional market failure, the optimal subsidy is higher. Note that optimal
policy is not influenced by market shares, since all producers have the same costs.
The strategic Nash equilibrium, on the other hand, is influenced by the upstream and
downstream market shares of the producing countries. To avoid excessive complications and
keep the focus on the scale effects, let us consider the equilibrium with symmetric producing
countries.

12

See proof of Proposition 6.

Proposition 7(a): In the symmetric Nash equilibrium, strategic countries subsidize both
downstream and upstream, and the presence of scale effects lowers that sum.
As in the other market failure examples, strategic countries want to maintain higher
prices for their net exports. What is interesting is that although scale effects increase the optimal
subsidy, they lower the total strategic subsidies. This result is not dependent on the third-party
market share (although it does influence the magnitude); rather, it reflects the spillover effects
and incentives to free-ride on the cost reductions made by the other’s investment in scale.
Proposition 7(b): With scale economies, symmetric strategic countries offer total subsidies that
are less than those desired by the global planner, even in the absence of a third-party
downstream market.
This result follows from Proposition 7(a) and stands in contrast to Proposition 1(c): with
imperfect competition as the only market failure, producers replicate the optimum in the absence
of the third-party market. Here, scale economies with global spillovers create incentives to
underinvest in capacity, since part of the benefits accrue to the other party.
Thus, if the upstream market is characterized by external scale economies, there is no
clear need in this partial equilibrium model for restrictions on upstream production subsidies.
Countries tend to prefer downstream subsidies to maintain higher global prices for their exports
and enjoy the spillover benefits of overall market scale.

Combining market failures: An application to renewable energy
The theoretical analysis draws intuition for situations in which strategic trade partners
may underprovide production subsidies in the presence of market failures. In this section, we
explore these results quantitatively in a parameterized application to the renewable energy
technology sector.
Numerical model
We represent the producer-consumer regions of Europe, the United States, and China,
since well as consumption in the rest of the world (ROW). Each region has a downstream market
for electricity generation that is closed to international trade (this framework could be applied
equally to renewable fuels in transportation). The downstream markets consist of firms located

and owned in the corresponding regions, and competition is perfect.13 Electricity generation with
conventional fossil-fueled technology leads to emissions of a pollutant that may have crossborder damages (e.g., CO2). An alternative energy technology, such as solar panels or wind
turbines, can produce electricity without emissions.
To calibrate the linear technology demand functions and the emissions consequences, we
use simplified static versions of the calibrated electricity sector models in Fischer et al. (2013)
for the United States and Hübler et al. (2016) for the European Union.14
The data represent annual electricity production in a near-term horizon of 2015-2020.
The downstream electricity market is composed of energy supply curves from coal, oil, natural
gas, nuclear, hydro, and non-hydro renewables. The latter are our focus, and they include wind,
biomass, solar, and others like geothermal, with wind being the dominant source. These
renewables represent 17% of EU electricity demand and 7% of US demand. All supply sources,
as well as consumer demand, respond to changes in electricity and carbon prices. We back out
from the system the implied demand for renewable energy capacity, as well as the emissions
consequences. For example, in the baseline, the average emissions of non-baseload
nonrenewable energy sources (essentially coal and gas, since the capacity of nuclear and hydro is
fixed) are 13% higher in the United States; however, when we calculate the marginal emissions
rates from these sources in response to a small price change, they are twice as high in the United
States as in the European Union.
For China and ROW, we use the supply mix projected for 2020 in the International
Energy Outlook 2013 (EIA 2013), depicted in Figure 1. Lacking comparable data to calibrate
their cost functions directly, as has been done for the United States and the European Union, we
calibrate the slopes of the supply curves to match the same supply elasticities as in the United
States, as China and ROW are more similar in their energy mix to the United States than the
European Union, which is by far the least fossil-fuel dependent. We note that by 2020, while the

13

The primary assumption is that the fossil supply curve is upward sloping and cost increases are fully passed

through. This assumption is less realistic for China, where prices are regulated and adjusted infrequently.
14

These models were designed for looking at endogenous technical change across two stages; to create a static
model, we use the first stage only.

EU and US electricity markets are projected to be similar in size, the Chinese power sector will
be nearly twice as large, and ROW’s almost four times as large.
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Figure 1. Projected baseline 2020 energy mix, by region (Source: EIA 2013)

Downstream outcomes, including the resulting demand for renewable energy, depend
importantly on the downstream policy assumptions. We incorporate a downstream carbon price

 i that varies across regions, as well as a downstream subsidy to renewable energy. ROW is
always assumed to have no policy. For example, for the European Union and the United States,
the calibrated downstream model calculates the following renewable energy demand functions:
xEU  6.04 1011  1.43 109 EU  3.65 1012 ( P   EU  P0 )
xUS  2.99 1011  5.06 109 US  5.32 1012 ( P  US  P0 )

where P0 is the global technology price in a baseline without subsidies.
For the upstream market, we draw on the wind turbine manufacturing sector, where the
top four producers of wind turbines (located in the United States and Europe) supply roughly
half the global market; from the top 10 producers, 70% of global production occurs in the United
States (16%), Europe (38%), and China (17%). For this first series of simulations, we focus on
the United States and Europe (REN21). The top two producers, GE from the United States and
Vestas from Denmark, had 15.5% and 14% market shares, respectively, in 2012. In a Cournot

model, these kinds of market shares occur when there about 7 firms; we round up to allocate 2
firms each to the United States and China and 4 to Europe, to maintain roughly the correct
producer market shares in our representation of imperfect competition. Since we perform
sensitivity analysis to the degree of competition, in scenarios with “perfect competition” we will
scale up firm numbers by a factor of 100, maintaining similar overall market shares.15
To consider cost and scale effects, we assume that levelized technology costs per kWh
generated in the baseline equal c = 0.045, which is half the lowest baseline electricity price.16 In
the absence of scale effects, this cost is fixed and its level has no effect on the results, since the
downstream renewable generation supply functions are calibrated to replicate the baseline, with
the intercepts adjusting one-for-one for the baseline input technology costs. We subsequently
compare a situation havingwith no scale effects with one where a doubling of scale reduces costs
by a third, relative to the baseline (i.e., g  c / 3 / YBaseline , and c0  c  ( A  c) g / B, where
A  0.0687  P0 and B  3.1477 1014 , as derived from the global downstream demand

function). The baseline technology price, P0 , is subsequently calibrated to reproduce the baseline
quantities, and depends on the number of firms and the baseline cost assumption.17
Results
In the following scenarios, we explore quantitatively the role of major factors identified
in the theoretical analysis. One set involves the value of the social cost of carbon (SCC), its
valuation by producer countries, and the pricing of carbon in downstream markets. These
variations explore the sensitivity of the optimal subsidies to the downstream market failure and
to preexisting downstream regulations. Another issue relates to downstream market shares, the
size of the export market, and the importance of the nonproducing region. Third, we are

15

This is a reasonable approximation within the Cournot framework, and avoids having to introduce a new cost
function as in the theory section.
16

This cost assumption is a rough estimate. Calculations by a consortium of industry experts in Europe found that
wind turbines make up three-quarters of the installed cost of wind generation capacity (http://www.wind-energy-thefacts.org/index-43.html accessed 3/17/2016), and operation and maintenance represents 25% of levelized costs
(http://www.wind-energy-the-facts.org/operation-and-maintenance-costs-of-wind-generated-power.html accessed
3/17/2016).
17

Any assumption about c has a 1-1 effect on this price, and subsequently an offsetting effect on the estimated
kWh

intercept of the marginal operating cost curve for renewable energy, which in the baseline must equal P0

 P0 .

interested in the degree of competition and scale economies, and to what extent upstream market
failures drive subsidies. Finally, we assess the welfare and distributional consequences of
optimal and strategic subsidies and restrictions on them.
Carbon externality and trade
We begin with a set of central assumptions: imperfect competition, no scale economies,
and no other climate policies, although the countries do value emissions at the global SCC.
Figure 2 reports optimal and strategic Nash subsidies for the European Union as a
function of the SCC when no region is taxing emissions. With no externality (SCC = 0) and
heterogeneous countries, the optimal upstream subsidy internalizes the upstream externality, here
about 1 cent/kWh. The Nash strategy for the European Union has an upstream subsidy roughly
half that size, paired with a small downstream subsidy that does not quite make up the difference.
As the SCC rises, there is a clear and growing deviation between the strategic and optimal
subsidies. The global planner would call for larger upstream subsidies—and downstream taxes—
as the SCC rises, since both strategies encourage more uptake of renewables and displacement of
polluting outside the relatively clean European Union.
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Figure 2: Optimal and strategic subsidies in European Union as function of SCC (with imperfect
competition, no scale economies, no carbon taxes)

For an SCC of $30, the optimal upstream subsidy is about 4 cents/kWh, reflecting the value of
the downstream eternality in ROW. The European Union, on the other hand, does raise its
upstream subsidy as the SCC rises, but less than is optimal, preferring to supplement with more
downstream subsidies.
Figure 3 shows the effective total subsidies (  i ) for each region under optimal (“*”)

and strategic policies, reported for the central assumptions. The European Union, having the
least-emissions-intensive electricity sector to start, has significantly lower optimal net subsidies
than the others, of which China, being the most coal reliant, has the highest. Note that for the
producer regions, the sums of the subsidies are quite similar in both the optimal and the strategic
cases; they rise accordingly with the SCC, as predicted in the theory (Proposition 5(a)), and the
difference is due to the response to imperfect competition, which strategic countries
underinternalize (Proposition 1(b)). The large difference is for ROW, where the optimal total
subsidy is much higher than the average upstream subsidy provided by strategic regions, and the
difference grows larger as the SCC increases.
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Figure 3. Optimal and strategic net subsidies as function of SCC (with imperfect competition, no
scale economies, no carbon taxes)

These subsidies all assume no carbon pricing. In fact, as long as ROW does not tax
carbon, optimal and strategic upstream subsidies do not depend on whether any other region
taxes carbon. The planner uses the upstream subsidy to internalize the upstream market failure
and the downstream market failure in ROW, and the downstream subsidy is used to internalize
the relative external costs in the producer countries (as in Proposition 4). Thus, if any producer
region taxes carbon at the SCC, the optimal subsidy in that region falls.
Similarly, the choice of subsidy by strategic regions is not influenced by other regions’
carbon-pricing behavior, but their own downstream subsidies fall when they choose to
internalize the carbon externality with a tax at home.18 These effects are illustrated in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Optimal (*) and strategic (N) subsidies as function of regional carbon pricing
(imperfect competition, no scale economies)

Role of ROW and exports in strategies
Figure 5 depicts the difference in optimal and strategic outcomes for deployment and
production of renewable energy technologies, assuming an SCC of $30 but no carbon taxes. Note

18

With scale economies, downstream subsidies for regions with carbon pricing will diverge somewhat because of
the differences in scale-related spillovers.

that in both cases the European Union experiences little change in renewable energy deployment,
but the other regions increase deployment substantially. Note also that in all the producer
countries, there is no difference in the deployment outcomes between the optimal and Nash
strategies. The difference lies in ROW, where the global planner’s greater reliance on upstream
subsidies leads to much greater deployment than the Nash outcome, where producers prefer
higher global technology prices.
The strategies have different producer country effects as well. The optimal subsidy policy
maintains the baseline market shares (50% for the European Union, 25% each for the United
States and China). The Nash equilibrium, however, shifts production away from Europe, a large
net exporter, toward China, which is a larger consumer nation and, as a smaller net exporter, has
less interest in withholding production to keep global prices high.
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Figure 5. Deployment and supply, by scenario (billions of kWh annual generation)

External scale effects and competition
The effects of scale economies are revealed in higher optimal net subsidies to offset the
additional upstream market failure. Figure 6 replicates Figure 3 but with the inclusion of scale
economies. In the absence of an environmental externality, the optimal subsidy has risen to 4
cents/kWh, 3 cents higher than without scale economies, and that premium grows along with the
SCC. The market failure of scale economies also drives a larger wedge between the optimal and
strategic sums of the subsidies for the producer regions, as predicted in the theory (Proposition

7(a)). And although scale economies increase the optimal upstream subsidies (the net subsidies
for ROW), they decrease the average upstream subsidies provided in the Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 6. Optimal and strategic net subsidies with scale economies as function of SCC
(no carbon taxes)

Scale economies, as modeled, interact with the degree of competition. In the scenario of
“perfect competition” (N = 800 instead of 8), optimal and Nash subsidies are negligible in the
absence of an environmental externality. Strategic downstream subsidies in the producer
countries equal the optimal net subsidies for those countries (as in Proposition 5(a)). With scale
economies, however, optimal upstream subsidies are 2 cents/kWh when SCC = 0, compared with
4 cents with imperfect competition (and 1 cent with imperfect competition alone, without scale
effects). Strategic countries with competitive firms do not subsidize upstream, but with scale
economies they do subsidize downstream at about 0.5 cents/kWh or less when SCC = 0, thus
internalizing roughly a quarter of the externality for the producer countries but achieving less
global scale than with a comparable upstream subsidy that would also apply to ROW demand.

Welfare effects of restrictions on subsidies
How do strategic subsidies and trade law constraints on them affect welfare in a situation
of market failures? Figure 7 considers the case in which we have imperfect competition and the
SCC is $30. To get a sense of the scale of the benefits of intervention, with the central
assumptions, implementing that SCC as a global carbon price (including ROW) would reap $60
billion in gains annually in the electricity sector. The vast majority of that improvement comes
from the global nature of the carbon tax; one loses only 3% of this welfare improvement by
eliminating the optimal subsidy for counteracting imperfect competition upstream. 19 By contrast,
if ROW does not implement carbon pricing, only 39% of the potential welfare gains from the
optimal mix would be captured. Thus, the carbon leakage externality is far more important than
the problem of imperfect competition.
For this reason, we next observe that optimal subsidies become close substitutes for
incomplete carbon pricing. On their own, optimal subsidies implemented in the producer
countries can generate a $20 billion improvement, almost as much as a carbon tax implemented
only in the producer countries, and nearly twice the gains of a carbon price applied only to the
European Union and the United States. The Nash equilibrium of strategic subsidies is somewhat
smaller but still achieves nearly $15 billion in global economic and environmental
improvements. It may be surprising that renewable energy subsidies can be nearly as effective as
carbon pricing among this coalition, since one loses the margin to switch among other fossil fuel
sources. This option turns out not to be that valuable: half of global electricity demand is in
ROW, which would not face a carbon price, and half of electricity demand facing the carbon tax
is in China, where natural gas plays a very small role. Meanwhile, carbon leakage is very
important, and renewable energy subsidies are the only policy option for addressing that.
Now consider the effects of restrictions. If upstream subsidies are made unavailable, as
represented by the Nash equilibrium with only downstream subsidies, the benefits fall to less
than $10 billion. It may be interesting to note that, although not depicted, the benefits of a carbon
tax that is restricted to the European Union and the United States are not much more than those
of Nash downstream subsidies alone. Finally, if we limit interventions to downstream subsidies
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If SCC = 0, the gains from optimal policy (an upstream subsidy) are even smaller, just $1 billion annually, but the
costs of restricting upstream subsidies remain similar in relative terms to the optimal policy combination.

in just the European Union and the United States, the benefits are negligible, since they draw
resources away from the rest of the world, where deployment has more value in reducing
emissions.
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Figure 7. Change in welfare from no policy; all regions value emissions at SCC of $30/ton CO2
(central assumptions of imperfect competition and no scale effects)

The presence of scale economies has important implications for the absolute and relative
welfare effects of the policies, as visualized in Figure 8. As renewables become significantly
cheaper, deployment expands and the welfare gains are much larger across the board, and nearly
double in the optimal policy scenario. The loss of upstream subsidies from the optimal policy
mix is much more costly because of the presence of spillovers: 25% of the potential gains are
lost when a global carbon tax is implemented alone.20 With the twin market failures of imperfect
competition and scale economies, optimal subsidies now not only outperform carbon taxation
among the producer countries but deliver nearly twice the gains. Strategic subsidies are less
effective but still allow for more gains than carbon pricing alone in the producer regions.
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The carbon tax here is fixed at the SCC; we do not adjust to a second-best level.
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Figure 8. Change in welfare from no policy with scale effects (with imperfect competition, all
regions value at SCC of $30/ton CO2)

An important question is whether downstream subsidies can produce scale effects that
make up for the loss of downstream subsidies. The results indicate that restricting the use of
upstream subsidies is somewhat less costly in relative terms when there are scale effects: Nash
downstream subsidies yield 24% of optimal gains with scale effects, compared with only 15%
without them. However, in absolute terms, the magnitude of the potential gains forgone is much
larger.
The distributional effects of the policies are quite different as well. The globally optimal
subsidies involve large transfers from producer to consumer countries, and more so from the
European Union, the largest net exporter and a region where consumption is discouraged by a
downstream tax. Nash subsidies actually cost producer countries, compared with no subsidies,
while benefiting ROW and to some extent China, a net importer of renewable energy technology.
Without upstream subsidies, producer countries are better off, but the environment and ROW are
worse off. Without scale economies, the environmental gains are larger with a carbon tax among

producer countries than with optimal subsidies, but when scale economies are present, optimal
subsidies reduce emissions more than the tax.

Conclusion
This analysis has shown the importance of considering the global consequences of market
failures when considering the value of market and trade interventions like subsidies—and the
potential costs of placing restrictions on them. For products with concentrated markets, emerging
technologies with scale effects, or green goods with global cross-border environmental benefits,
underprovision may be a real problem. In these cases, subsidies can help correct the market
failures. In particular, upstream subsidies—by depressing global prices of the green good—tend
to generate larger global benefits. However, it is these kinds of manufacturing subsidies that
WTO rules tend to restrain. Although producer countries may benefit from these restrictions,
global welfare is higher with strategic subsidy competition.
In the case of climate change, when constraints are put on carbon pricing (e.g., because of
principles of common but differentiated responsibilities for developing countries or political
resistance in developed countries), technology policies like subsidies become important secondbest tools. They are more effective to the extent they can reach all the major emitters, including
developing and emerging economies, and toward that end, upstream interventions become
relatively valuable. Furthermore, in the present framework, when regions maximize their own
welfare, strategic subsidies do not overcompensate for the external effects; restrictions on
upstream subsidies then become counterproductive.
Of course, governments may have their objectives distorted by interest group lobbying, as
emphasized in the “protection for sale” literature launched by Grossman and Helpman (1994,
1995), leading to undesired protectionism. Fischer (2016) extends the present model to include
an additional objective of promoting domestic industry scale, in which case allowing strategic
upstream subsidies is very costly in global welfare terms unless external benefits are sufficiently
high—or sufficiently undervalued. She also considers the alternative to upstream subsidies that
the developed or producer countries could subsidize deployment in ROW (as with climate
finance), but their strategic incentives to do so are significantly less, since they cannot guarantee
that those subsidies would benefit their own producers, as they can with upstream subsidies.

Most of the analysis in this paper relies merely on the assumptions that global supply
curves for the green good are upward sloping and that downstream demand for the good is
downward sloping. Thus, the qualitative results should be robust to other frameworks. Although
we have explored an application to renewable energy, the lessons should apply to a broad range
of goods with spillover effects. For example, vaccines and therapies for communicable diseases
can have global externalities as long as they remain under strict patent protection.
The larger caveats to the conclusions relate to other, unmodeled rationales for which
restrictions on manufacturing subsidies might be warranted. A deadweight loss from the taxation
needed to fund subsidies makes them a more costly tool; however, national governments should
internalize these costs, as would a global planner. In contrast, other market structure issues in
which subsidies may lead to dynamic inefficiencies—like an ability to deter foreign entry and
ultimately competition—are more likely to temper interest in loosening the restraints on
industrial policy.21 Indeed, these allegations have been made recently in the case of solar panels.
These issues are in addition to the problem of lobbying and rent seeking already mentioned.
Finally, several kinds of policies can have the effect of lowering upstream costs without
direct subsidies to manufacturing and the related controversies. One example is regulatory policy
that improves competition among suppliers, to address the distortions from market power.
Another oft-used example is R&D support, which can also address innovation spillovers and is
rarely disputed internationally, although as a subsidy it is still not exempt from WTO scrutiny.
Given the many trade-offs regarding upstream interventions, more research is needed on
the global effects of subsidies for green goods. Then a more thoughtful discussion can take place
about whether and how to carve out appropriate legal space for such subsidies in international
trade and environmental agreements.
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On the other hand, Dixit and Kyle (1985) show that although protection for domestic entry promotion is generally
bad from a global standpoint, subsidies for entry promotion are more beneficial, and countermeasures against them
ineffective or harmful.
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Appendix
Analytical results
The results are derived and verified using Mathematica. Where possible, rather than
assuming away producer heterogeneity, we focus on global average subsidies to compare the
Nash equilibrium with that of the social planner. In some cases, to avoid unnecessary
complications for our core intuition, we may make the following simplifications of downstream
demand symmetry among the producing regions: m1  m2  (1  m3 ) / 2 .
Cournot competition
Proof of Proposition 1(a)
With a Cournot duopoly, the optimal policy is

 C* 
where N  n1  n2 .

( a  c)
, C*  0
N

The Nash equilibrium, on the other hand, produces

 CNash

,i

(a  c)( N  1  2m3  m3 ( N  2ni  m3 ))
0
2ni ( N  1  2m3 )

CNash

,i

(a  c)m3
 0.
( N  1  2m3 )

(The expression for  CNash
assumes m1  m2 ; the downstream Nash subsidies are
,i
independent of producing region heterogeneity).
Proof of Proposition 1(b)
Sales-weighted producer subsidies are independent of the distribution of demand shares
and firms among the producing regions.
The average sales-weighted upstream subsidy is less than half the optimal subsidy:



Nash
C

n1 Nash n2 Nash (a  c) ( N  1  2m3  m3 ( N  m3 )) (a  c)  C*
  C ,1   C ,2 


N
N
N
2( N  1  2m3 )
2N
2

Since the downstream subsidies are identical, even with asymmetric producing regions,
their average is the same: CNash 

(a  c)m3
.
N  1  2m3

We thus see that the sum of the subsidies is less than that of the planner, to the extent that

m3  0 :
 CNash  CNash 

(a  c)( N  1  (2  m3 )m3 ) (a  c)

  C* .
N ( N  1  2m3 )
N

Furthermore, the upstream share is decreasing in N and m3 :

 CNash
Nm3
1
 1

Nash
Nash
 C  C
N  1  m3 (2  m3 ) 1  1/ N
Proof of Proposition 1(c)
When m3  0 ,

*
CNash
,i    0 , so no downstream subsidies are used. Upstream, the

Nash
*
average subsidy equals that of the planner:  C   . However, the individual upstream

subsidies depend on the extent to which each region is a net importer or exporter:

 CNash
,1 

(a  c)(1  m1  m2 )
. The producing region with greater consumption and fewer firms
2n1

(implying status as a net importer) has a higher subsidy.
Proof of Proposition 1(d)
When maximizing {W1  W2 } , the jointly optimal subsidies are
(a  c)(2  N  m3 )
 0;
2N
(a  c)

 CNash
 0.
,i
2

 CJoint 
CJoint

Proof of Proposition 2(a)
Suppose that downstream subsidies are prohibited. The global optimum is unchanged, but
the Nash equilibrium provides a smaller subsidy. We also solve for the optimal subsidies for the
jointly maximized welfare of the producer states, and find that it is yet smaller:

(a  c)
N
(a  c)((1  Nm3 )  N  1)
 CNash  0 
  C*
N ((1  m3 )  N  1)

 C*  0 

 CJoint  0 

(a  c)(1  Nm3 )
  CNash
  C*
 0
N (1  m3 )

This reveals the tension between the producer states’ incentives to restrict competition,
their noncooperative incentives to protect market share, and global incentives to address the
market failure of imperfect competition.
Proof of Proposition 2(b)
If upstream subsidies are prohibited, and one cannot subsidize downstream in the third
country, then the downstream subsidy must balance its effectiveness to internalize the upstream
market failure with its effects on the terms of trade. The planner will want a smaller downstream
subsidy than the (unconstrained) optimal upstream subsidy, to the extent that m3  0 :

C*  0 

(a  c)
  C*
N  m3 (2  1/ N )

The Nash equilibrium is more complicated, because producer heterogeneity—on both the
supply and the demand side—influences the constrained strategic subsidy. Assuming fully
symmetric producers (i.e., m1  m2 , n1  n2 ), we see that the Nash subsidy is still less than the
optimal constrained downstream subsidy:

CNash  0 

(a  c)(1  m3 ) N
2(1  N )( N  m3 )  1  m32

Note that when upstream subsidies are prohibited, if the entire downstream market is in
the third country (i.e., m3  1 ), then the Nash equilibrium replicates the optimal policy if the
producers have equal upstream market shares (n1  N / 2) :

m3  1: i*,C

 0



(a  c)2ni
(a  c) N
; iNash
,C   0 
2
(1  N )
(1  N )2

On the other hand, if there is no third country market, the symmetric Nash equilibrium
underprovides the downstream subsidy (we demonstrate this result with m1  m2 , n1  n2 ):

m3  0 : CNash

 0



( a  c)
( a  c)

 C*
 0
N  ( N  1  1/ N )
N

Unilateral policies
If subsidies can be implemented only in one jurisdiction, then  1*

 2 0,2 0

 ( a  c) / n . A

strategic region 1, however, would subsidize downstream, as well as upstream, with the sum still
less than the constrained optimal subsidy:

1 

2  0,2  0

1 

2  0,2  0

1 

2  0,2  0



(a  c)  3  4n(1  m3 )  m3 (2  m3 ) 
0
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(a  c)(1  m3 )
0
2n(1  2n  m3 )
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2  0,2  0



(a  c)(3  m3 )
  1*
 2  0,2  0
4n

Downstream externality
With a nonzero external benefit from downstream consumption of the green good, the
analytical expressions for the Nash equilibrium subsidies become too elaborate to repeat here,
since the second market failure also interacts with the first market failure of imperfect
competition. Here, to develop intuition, we either focus on the downstream externality by itself
(taking the limit of the optimal subsidies as N   ) or assume symmetry among the producer
regions.
Proof of Proposition 3
This follows from Proposition 1(a), taking the limit of the optimal subsidies as N   .
Proof of Proposition 4
With imperfect competition, the optimal policy is

a  c vG 

N
N
*
i  ( i  3 )vG

 i*  3vG 

Thus, as N   ,  i*  3vG .
Proof of Proposition 5(a)
The symmetric Nash equilibrium (denoted with X and assuming m1  m2 , n1  n2 , and

2  1 ) produces

 XNash   CNash 


v0
N (1  N  2m3 )

 XNash   X v  CNash 

  m3 3
(1  N  2m3 )

v  0.

Where   (1  m3 )  (1  3m3  2 N )   2m3 ( N  m3 ) 3 
But without imposing any assumptions of symmetry, we find that  iNash  0 , and

iNash  vi i as N   .
Proof of Proposition 5(b)
With m3  0, and v1  v2  vG , we can demonstrate in Mathematica (without imposing
symmetry) that  Nash  iNash  vG i ; thus, each region has optimal deployment incentives.
Proof of Proposition 5(c)
Simplifying the difference between the Nash and globally optimal upstream subsidies, we
see that

 Nash  iNash  ( G  iG )  

m3 (a  c)
m v (  (1  N )  m11  m2 2 )
 3 G 3
N (1  N  2m3 )
N (1  N  2m3 )

G
G
 CNash iNash
,C  (  C i ,C )

Thus, as long as 3  (m11  m2 2 ) / (1  N ) , the interaction between the downstream
externality and the presence of the third market exacerbates the underprovision of subsidies for
the green good.

Scale effects
Proof of Proposition 6
Solving for the globally optimal subsidies, and substituting the value of c0 , we find

 S* ,i 

(a  c0 )(b  g ( N  1)) (a  c)  (b  g ) 2  Ng (b  g )  (a  c)



N (b  2 g )
N 
(b  g ) 2  g 2
N


S* ,i  0
Thus, the optimal subsidy is higher than that to correct for imperfect competition alone,
and no downstream subsidies are needed.
The optimal upstream subsidy implies optimal global output of YS* 

(a  c)(b  g )
, using
b(b  2 g )

our value of c0 . We thus restrict our scale parameter to g  b / 2.
Proof of Proposition 7
Solving for the symmetric Nash equilibrium subsidies, we get

2(a  c0 )(b  g )((b  g )(1  2m3  m32 )  bN (1  m3 ))
0
N
(a  c0 )b((b  g )2m3  gN (1  m3 ))

0

 SNash

,i
SNash
,i



where   2b2 ( N  1  2m3 )  bg (4 N  5(1  2m3 )  3m32 )  g 2 (1  2m3  m32 ) . Note that   0 if

g  b / 2.
Next, substituting the value of c0 , we have



Nash
S ,i

SNash
,i

2(a  c)(b  g ) 2 ((b  g )(1  2m3  m32 )  bN (1  m3 ))

N
(a  c)(b  g )(2m3 (b  g )  gN (1  m3 ))




Scale effects depress total Nash subsidy contributions, relative to imperfect competition
alone:

(a  c) g (( N 2  1)b(b  g )  g (2(b  g )  N )
(
  )  (
 )

0
m3  0
N b(2( N  1)b 2  (4 N  5)bg  ( N  3) g 2 )
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Nash
Nash
( SNash
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0
,i
,i )  ( C ,i  C ,i ) m 1  
3
N b( N  3)
Nash
S ,i

Nash
S ,i

Nash
C ,i

Nash
C ,i

However, depending on g, the use of upstream subsidies in this mix may be higher or
lower.
Proof of Proposition 8
Setting m3  0 , we have



Nash
S ,i



Nash
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m3  0

(a  c)(b  g )(2(b  g )(( N  1)b  g )  bgN 2 )

bN (2( N  1)b2  (4 N  5)bg  ( N  3) g 2 )

The optimal subsidy package in this case is

 S* ,i  S* ,i m 0   S* ,i m 0 
3

3

(a  c)(b  g )(b  ( N  1) g ))
Nb(b  2 g )

We can then show that

 S* ,i   SNash
SNash
,i
,i

m3 0



(a  c)(b  g )3 g ( N  1)2
0
(b  2 g )bN (2( N  1)b2  (4 N  5)bg  ( N  3) g 2 )

Thus, for g > 0, the Nash duopoly no longer replicates the social optimum.
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